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THREE COHORTS’ VULNERABILITIES 




Getting to write this introduction to an octet of stimulating Articles is the 
second honor I received at this Symposium.
1
 In October 2019, I joined the 
live event as a panel moderator. Both of these occasions—panel moderation 
then, synthesis now—have brought elegant and stimulating diversity to my 
tasks. Dividing the variation into subgroups that each unite around a theme 
had to be done at the live event, and now returns in this Introduction as I 
frame eight works that started as presentations in the Bell Courtroom in 
Norman, Oklahoma and are now Articles.  
Erin Sheley, leader of the Symposium, arranged the nine October 2019 
presentations into three panels, a familiar number. American legal 
education features many threes. Most students go to law school for that 
number of years, and take mostly three-credit courses in a calendar that for 
most of us has three seasons: fall semester, spring semester, and summer.
2
 
We nine authors in the Symposium are law professors, a group tasked with 
the tripartite job description of teaching, scholarship, and service.
3
 
Panel 1, on higher education, had the narrowest focus of the October 
event. Titled “Where We Learn: Title IX and Sexual Assault,” it featured 
                                                                                                             
 * Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  
 1. The original nonet was equally stimulating. 
 2. Exceptions like an occasional quarter system “prove the rule” in the sense of 
underscoring its dominance. 
 3. I find myself threeing all the time. Over three (3) decades of law teaching I’ve 
discussed and lectured on several doctrinal tests that have three elements needed for a 
plaintiff to prevail. Some of them arise in a field that features three types of tortious conduct. 
Another subject I teach has three types of product defects. Family Law in my classroom 
examines marriage by looking first at entry into this relation, then at regulation of the 
ongoing marriage, and lastly at divorce. For threesomes in my writings, see ANITA 
BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 171 (2018) [hereinafter 
BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW] (reading Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to find “two 
trinities” in it: “three segments to each pregnancy” and “three sets of interests to be balanced 
against one another”); Anita Bernstein, Treble Damages in New York: A Field Guide, 
N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 13, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/ 
1202783664927/treble-damages-in-new-york-a-field-guide/ (“Plaintiffs who prevail in court 
can collect extra money—more than compensatory damages, that is—by three different 
means.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
2 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
 
 
Hannah Brenner Johnson, Erin Buzuvis, and Sarah Swan. The other two 
panels offered wider-ranging conversations. Panel 2, “Between Yesterday 
and Tomorrow: Change and Conflict in the Legal Discourse Around Sex 
Offenses,” included presentations from Kelly Behre, Donald Dripps, and 
one no longer here. Panel 3, which I had the privilege of moderating, “In 
the Boardroom and Beyond: Consent in the Institutional Context,” brought 
together Russell Christopher, Shawn Fields, and Erin Sheley.  
In this introduction I offer a somewhat different arrangement of the 
Articles, a 2-2-4. This re-division is not a disagreement or superimposition 
with the layout that worked so well last fall but a second look that presents 
a thesis. In the array I offer here, eight Articles converge and divide around 
three vulnerabilities.  
I use “vulnerabilities” plural rather than vulnerability singular because 
each of the groups I identify here is exposed to the possibility of a distinct 
category of harm with respect to sexual assault,
4
 the issue that occupies this 
Symposium. Different dangers threaten different groups and individuals. 
Each of these very different eight Articles works to highlight one cohort’s 
perspective or vulnerability.  
The First Cohort: Persons Vulnerable to Sexual Predation 
Erin Sheley and Shawn Fields have put at center stage persons 
vulnerable to sexual predation. Professor Sheley writes about statements 
that describe victim impacts,
5
 Professor Fields about dress codes for 
students in grade school.
6
 While both authors have girls and young women 
in mind, they write about these protagonists with attention to different 
traits. 
Sheley wades into the controversial waters of victim impact statements 
by finding a new place for them in claims of injury brought against 
institutional defendants. Narratives from persons who have suffered sexual 
abuse that they attribute to institutional wrongdoing “have the potential to 
                                                                                                             
 4. I occasionally use “rape” as an approximate synonym for sexual assault and 
criminal sexual conduct, aware that for decades the word rape has been ebbing in codified 
crimes. See Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of 
the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 2197, 2199 n.23 (1992) (reporting the same 
authorial choice). 
 5. Erin Sheley, Victim Impact Statements and Corporate Sex Crimes, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 
209 (2020). 
 6. Shawn E. Fields, Institutionalizing Consent Myths in Grade School, 73 OKLA. L. 
REV. 173 (2020). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/2
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serve a unique purpose: to transmit to the public the lived reality of 




Retellings of a bad experience are thought of as communicating pain, but 
they also communicate power—by which Sheley means not the eloquence 
of a narrative but the rawer power that an institution has over a person. 
Sheley notes victims’ “comparative helplessness relative to a company.”
8
 
Impact statements end up saying more than just Here’s how I was hurt. 
They limn an otherwise abstract offender whose “continued temporal 
existence” is central to its capacity to do harm.
9
 
Continuing this attention to persons vulnerable to sexual predation, 
Fields argues that “seemingly innocuous modesty-based dress codes” used 
in many American grade schools “perpetuate a male-centric system of 
implied consent and general entitlement to sexual conduct.”
10
 School 
administrators who impose this regulation tend to defend it as a distraction-
reducer that shelters young people from crashing waves of hormones. But 
even if dress codes increase levels of attention paid to the official 
curriculum—a claim that in my view should not be credited until it gets 
support from controlled studies, a politically infeasible prospect—they also 
bring in trouble: 
This rationale . . . tells boys that it is “the girl’s responsibility to 
cover up, and if she doesn’t it’s her fault he got distracted” . . . 
[and it also] tells girls that they are responsible for preventing 
this irresistible urge of the opposite sex, and that it is their fault 
for dressing so provocatively if boys gaze, leer, whistle, catcall, 
or touch. As one dress code critic noted, this approach serves as 
a microcosm of “a culture that’s so used to looking at issues of 
harassment and assault through the wrong end of the telescope,” 
directed at “girls’ own clothing” rather than the kind of sexually 
predatory behavior directed at girls.”
11
  
A second-order defense of gendered dress codes that interests Fields 
holds that compulsory modesty functions to liberate schoolgirls.
12
 
                                                                                                             
 7. Sheley, supra note 5, at 226.  
 8. Id. at 221.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Fields, supra note 6, at 177. 
 11. Id. at 187 (citations omitted).  
 12. Id. at 180, 183. 
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Exploring the familiar idea that chains can set people free, critics have been 
observing for years that lately (in contrast to the more innocent earlier time 
they think they remember) a girl is pressed to look sexy and the age at 
which this pressure starts is now alarmingly low.
13
 Fields does not deny this 
conventional wisdom; he complicates it. His Article reminds readers that 
clothes cover the surface of a human being—a person, not (just) a 
distraction-unit or provocation or trouble-stirrer.
14
 Our heroine could chafe 
at being forced into sackcloth. She might “want to dress provocatively to 
attract attention from a particular person, be it a boyfriend or girlfriend, or 
simply a love interest,” Fields observes.
15
 When she has this desire and acts 
on it, recall the Symposium theme of consent: “Inviting a consensual 
response from that singular individual . . . does not mean that she has 
granted general consent to all people in the public sphere.”
16
  
Persons vulnerable to sexual predation bring ideas and feelings and 
wishes and experiences to the law. Sheley and Fields do not portray the 
girls and women in their Articles as necessarily correct, or always innocent 
in the sense of empty, blank, devoid. These individuals take actions for 
which they have reasons. They make an impact not only on the law but on 
the people around them and the institutions in which they live, work, and 
learn. 
The Second Cohort: Persons Vulnerable to Accusations 
of Sexual Predation 
Just as Erin Sheley and Shawn Fields do not idealize persons vulnerable 
to sexual predation, the Articles in this second of three divisions do not 
idealize those who are vulnerable to accusations of sexual assault. Donald 
Dripps and Russell Christopher care about the harm of sexual predation; 
they do not categorically question or disbelieve accusations that it occurred. 
To this reader at least, their attention to accused persons demonstrates the 
value of the symposium as a unit of legal scholarship in contrast to a 
solitary article, the monad that could have been published by itself. These 
pieces join a larger dialogue. I arrange Professor Dripps first in my 
                                                                                                             
 13. Another October, a friend of mine sighed to me that Halloween costumes for young 
women she sees on offer “these days” seem limited to “slutty nurse, slutty French maid, 
slutty Harry Potter.” 
 14. Fields, supra note 6, at 186.  
 15. Id. at 201. 
 16. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/2
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sequence because it is he who reminds us most explicitly why we readers 
must heed the interests of accused persons.  
Sexual assault violates codified law, Dripps writes, and “criminal 
statutes ought to respect the legal virtues—fair warning, constraint of 
discretion, and neutral determinations of wrongfulness ex ante.”
17
 Lack of 
consent, when included among the elements of a sexual-assault crime, 
raises the doctrinal and jurisprudential problem of vagueness: “Major areas 
of legal uncertainty include what the scope of consent, if given, may be, and 
what inducements other than force or threat of force make assent or 
acquiescence different from consent as used in the statute. The literature 
abounds with examples, many of them nothing but purely hypothetical.”
18
 
Reformers who find progressive potential in relative newcomers like 
“affirmative consent” and “no means no,” Dripps argues, face challenges of 
drafting and line-drawing when they write these ideals into law.
19
  
Carefully reviewing decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court as well as 
rape cases adjudicated at the state level, Dripps finds dangers of both under- 
and over-prosecution in rape cases where consent is at issue. Dripps 
acknowledges that one danger is more prevalent than the other: “In the real 
world, criminal justice actors are far more likely to reject meritorious rape 
prosecutions than to press the envelope of statutory liability.”
20
 Void for 
vagueness as a doctrine, however, condemns arbitrary discretion no matter 
which way it cuts.
21
 
Stakes of over-prosecution also emerge in the Article by Russell 
Christopher. Writing about positive autonomy, Christopher highlights the 
choice to engage in a sexual act as a source of satisfaction for oneself.
22
 
Consent as a constituent of rape law focuses on the negative kind of 
autonomy, the right to refuse and reject.
23
 Professor Christopher introduces 
                                                                                                             
 17. Donald A. Dripps, Due Process Overbreadth? The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 
Fundamental Rights, and the Brewing Storm Over Undefined Consent in Sexual Assault 
Statutes, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 121, 158 (2020). 
 18. Id. at 147. 
 19. Id. at 154–56. 
 20. Id. at 149. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Russell Christopher, Unconditional Coercion and Positive Autonomy, 73 OKLA. L. 
REV. 159, 160–61 (2020). 
 23. I share Professor Christopher’s keen interest in autonomy, although I focus more on 
the negative stripe. In my book about it, I call the object of my attentive negative liberty 
rather than negative autonomy because to my mind “liberty” makes helpful reference to the 
power of the state. BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 7–8; cf. RONALD 
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positive autonomy with horrific facts found in a decision by the California 
Court of Appeal, People v. Hooker: 
[A] husband and wife kidnapped the adult victim at knifepoint 
and held her captive. The victim was held naked, bound, gagged, 
blindfolded, and chained to a bed. After several years of 
continuing captivity, the husband began having intercourse with 
the victim. Undoubtedly, one would believe the horrendous 




The Hooker husband-defendant would not have obtained the acquiescence 
he received if he hadn’t first violated the negative autonomy of his “adult 
victim.” Pre-intercourse acts done by Cameron Hooker were uncommon: 
Few people (I presume) kidnap another person at knifepoint and chain their 
captive gagged and blindfolded to a bed. But once his deviant pre-
intercourse actus rei were behind him, Mr. Hooker moved to sexual 
conduct that from the outside looks close to ordinary. Christopher locates in 
Hooker a paradox wherein “factual consent under adverse conditions that 
have become institutionalized or normalized may constitute legal 
                                                                                                             
DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 4 (2011) (defining liberty as covering “that part of your 
freedom that government would do wrong to constrain”). I have contended that positive 
liberty is less important than negative liberty. BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, 
at 35 (“[T]he common law does not address our unmet needs for good things. Instead it 
heeds and honors our objections, resistances, and protests.”).  
Closer to Christopher’s point, I have also noted that the common law “cares nothing 
about the utility that a human being might hold as a sexual receptacle for another person, or 
the possibility that venturesome traveling into the geography of someone else might be more 
commendable than a closed-off refusal to consider an offer of penetration.” Id. at 141.  
 24. Christopher, supra note 22, at 161 (footnotes omitted) (citing People v. Hooker, 244 
Cal. Rptr. 337, 338–39 (Ct. App. 1988) (depublished)). The Hooker facts are uglier than 
Christopher’s summary indicates. Rather than mention them all, I quote below one passage 
from the decision that reports some of what Cameron Hooker did to the victim, a young 
woman named Colleen:  
During this time, Hooker regularly practiced bondage on Colleen, suspending 
her from the rafters, constricting her breathing, whipping her, keeping her head 
encased in the headbox, tying her to the rack, shocking her with electrical 
cords, burning her pubic area with a heat lamp, and immersing her in the 
bathtub until she was unable to breathe. Colleen once estimated that Hooker 
hung her and whipped her 90 to 100 times in the first six months. 
Hooker, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 339.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/2





 Both the initiator and the target of his initiative live under these 
conditions.
26
 Sharing with one’s aggressor a “lifeworld,”
27
 the set of 
material and political circumstances that no one can entirely exit or tune 
out, has an impact on what a recipient of sexual initiative wants.  
Christopher ascribes a point of view to the famed feminist scholar 
Catharine MacKinnon: Those aforementioned social conditions make it 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to say whether a woman has consented to an 
act of sexual intercourse with a man.
28
 To put the point of view in front of 
us, I’ll quote a different passage from an early article.  
Women, says MacKinnon, are 
violated every day by men who have no idea of the meaning of 
their acts to women. To them, it is sex. Therefore, to the law, it is 
sex. That is the single reality of what happened. When a rape 
prosecution is lost on a consent defense, the woman has not only 
failed to prove lack of consent, she is not considered to have 
been injured at all. Hermeneutically unpacked, read: because he 
did not perceive she did not want him, she was not violated. She 
had sex. Sex itself cannot be an injury. Women consent to sex 





                                                                                                             
 25. Christopher, supra note 22, at 165.  
 26. For acknowledgment that my diction is awkward, see Anita Bernstein, The 
Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 736–37 n.6 
(2002) [hereinafter Bernstein, Communities]; Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the 
Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Aggression]. I 
thank Sarah Swan for her stimulating insights about the diction problem. 
 27. “The lifeworld is the unproblematic, taken-for-granted setting in which actors are 
located spatially, temporally, and socially. . . . Actors interpret and define their situation, and 
formulate their plans, in reliance upon a ‘stock of knowledge’—socially conditioned and 
transmitted, and differentially distributed among a society’s members.” Hugh Baxter, System 
and Lifeworld in Habermas’s Theory of Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 511–12 (2002) 
(footnotes omitted) (citing 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: 
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 124–25 (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981); ALFRED SCHUTZ & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE STRUCTURES 
OF THE LIFEWORLD 3–6, 19, 35–92, 113–16, 122, 124–25, 304–18 (Richard M. Zaner & H. 
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. trans., 1973)). 
 28. Christopher, supra note 22, at 170–71. 
 29. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 652–53 (1983). 
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At the live version of this Symposium, Christopher wove this perspective 
together with a strand from the dystopian novel The Handmaid’s Tale. The 
protagonist Handmaid of this book, Offred (“belonging to Fred”), lives 
under harsh violations of her liberty in consequence of being female in a 
society that subordinates female persons.
30
 Offred reports sexual desires 
that extend beyond the leave-me-alone negative half of an autonomy 
binary.  
For Christopher, the unsettling—and arguably harmful or self-
destructive—wishes of Offred in fiction and human beings in real life 
deserve respect because they originate in autonomy of a different sort, the 
other half of liberty. MacKinnon’s focus on sex as violation, Christopher 
writes, “too greatly diminishes our positive autonomy.”
31
 That focus 
“protects our negative autonomy exceedingly well. But it not only violates 
our positive autonomy, it nearly completely eliminates it.”
32
 
The Third Cohort: Vulnerabilities of Institutions Obliged to Comply 
with Title IX of the Civil Rights Act 
Institutions of higher learning that cannot personally experience a sexual 
assault or an unjust accusation of misconduct are categorically different 
from persons vulnerable to sexual assault and persons vulnerable to 
accusations of sexual assault. Entities have “no soul to damn, no body to 
kick.”
33
 Yet they matter, here in the Symposium as elsewhere: half the 
Articles assembled here focus on them. Concluding with this cohort pays a 
closing tribute to the person who envisioned this Symposium. Recall that 
victim impact statements for Erin Sheley “transmit to the public the lived 
reality of something that may not seem intellectually plausible: sexual 
assault by an entity.”
34
 
Hannah Brenner Johnson, Sarah Swan, Kelly Behre, and Erin Buzuvis 
build on Sheley’s view that entities are responsible for some of the sexual 
assaults that occur on their campuses. Commendably, in my view, all four 
                                                                                                             
 30. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (First Anchor Books Movie Tie-In ed. 
2017) (1986).  
 31. Christopher, supra note 22, at 171. 
 32. Id.  
 33. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); see also 
Sheley, supra note 5, at 213 (blaming “a lack of imagination” for the tendency of 
corporations to escape punishment).  
 34. Sheley, supra note 5, at 226. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/2
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authors cite recent litigation in their Articles. Their interest in law on the 
ground brings immediacy to writings that also deliver nuance and original 
thinking. Just as Sheley and Fields espouse no partisan agreement with 
stances taken by persons vulnerable to sexual predation and Dripps and 
Christopher do not side categorically with accused persons over accusers, 
the four Articles in this concluding third of the Symposium are 
emphatically not advocating for the Title IX interests of colleges and 
universities. Indeed, they each separately want more accountability for 




Reading Title IX to Protect Non-Students Present on Campus 
Hannah Brenner Johnson leads with Doe v. University of Kentucky,
36
 a 
decision that considers whether rights and entitlements provisioned to 
students in Title IX extend to persons on campus who are not enrolled.
37
 In 
advocating a yes answer to that question some of the time, Brenner Johnson 
has in mind individuals who exhibit traits in common with enrolled 
                                                                                                             
 35. Consider, for example, the so-called “Dear Colleague Letter” imposed on this cohort 
in 2011. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
(Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. In it 
the federal Department of Education told Title IX-covered institutions to use a relatively low 
standard of proof for sexual harassment and sexual violence claims. See id. A firestorm 
ensued, and in 2017 the Department under a new presidential administration withdrew much 
of this guidance. See generally Peter C. Anderson, Note, The Evidentiary Standard in 
Collegiate Sexual Assault Proceedings During the Trump Administration, 22 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 107 (2019) (exploring consequences of this development for institutions). 
Having to tell the Department of Education each year how many campus rapes were reported 
to them presumably stirs discomfort among university managers because a relatively high 
score threatens to alienate prospective students. See Editorial, Admit Enrollment Is 
Chronically Down Because of Rape, MONTANA KAIMIN (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://www.|montanakaimin.com/opinion/admit-enrollment-is-chronically-down-because-of-
rape/article_5cda5d6c-7142-11e5-845a-b39fa41e6dbe.html (adverting, in a student 
newspaper, to reports of rape as depressing enrollment at a flagship university); cf. Libby 
Nelson, Ranking Colleges Based on Reported Campus Rapes Is a Horrible, Dangerous Idea, 
VOX (June 8, 2016, 4:00 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/8/11879626/colleges-
most-rapes-ranked (urging consumers not to infer much from a low or a high number 
because low can mean reporting is discouraged and high can show confidence among 
complainants that they will be heeded) (“Rape statistics aren’t just misleading—they’re 
meaningless.”). 
 36. 357 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Ky. 2019).  
 37. See Hannah Brenner Johnson, Standing In Between Sexual Violence Victims and 
Access to Justice: The Limits of Title IX, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 15 (2020). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
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students, her phrase “campus visitors (non-students)” implies peers, friends, 
and colleagues of the matriculated population.
38
 The pseudonymous 
plaintiff who sought redress from the University of Kentucky “lived on 
campus,” “was involved in campus life,” and, perhaps most important, had 
a rental agreement for her dormitory room that required her to abide by 
university codes that governed students.
39
  
Brenner Johnson argues that the Kentucky federal trial court erred when 
it ruled in favor of the university and against this plaintiff. “Colleges and 
universities, while reliant on the presence of and tuition generated by their 
enrolled students, cannot entirely depend on insiders to succeed,” Brenner 
Johnson explains.
40
 Instead, “[t]hese educational institutions actively solicit, 
depend on, and profit from engagement with outsiders every single day to 
fulfill their educational mission.”
41
 From here, the court continued to err 
when it said that the plaintiff lacked standing. That’s not what standing 
means, Brenner Johnson argues.
42
  
Standing as a barrier to relief rests on a concern that permitting this 
plaintiff to prosecute a claim threatens the quality of a judicial decision.
43
 
No such danger is present when visitors who suffer sexual assault seek 
redress under Title IX. These outsiders are in a sense insiders, because their 
presence on campus advances the purpose and goals of the institution. 
“Although colleges and universities are bound by their own unique rules 
and norms and exist somewhat like communities within a broader 
community,” Brenner Johnson writes, “they require a steady stream of 
outsiders to meet their stated educational objectives.”
44
 
Discrimination in the Enforcement of Title IX  
Articles by Sarah Swan and Kelly Behre come together under this 
heading. Continuing chronologically from where Hannah Brenner Johnson 
left off—the entrance point to making a complaint—Sarah Swan addresses 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 25–26 (citing Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d at 621–22, 631–32). 
 40. Id. at 20. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 30–32.  
 43. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: 
Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) 
(“Moreover, standing enhances the quality of judicial decisions expounding federal law by 
ensuring that they are made in the context of a concrete dispute between adverse parties with 
a genuine stake in the outcome—not a mere intellectual or ideological interest in the law.”).  
 44. Brenner Johnson, supra note 37, at 32. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/2
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the resolution of complaints that universities receive from persons alleging 
injury.
45
 Echoing Donald Dripps’ identification of both over- and under-
enforcement of rape crimes, Swan posits two types of error here: unfairness 
to accused persons and unfairness to accusers. And similar to how Dripps 
united his two problems under one banner, vagueness, Swan applies one 
label on this two-sided wrong: “discriminatory dualism.”
46
 
Swan finds analogies in other pairings of both too much and too little 
doled out to a subordinated group. My favorite of her illustrations is 
mortgage lending. African American candidates for home loans experienced 
first too little credit, in the era of redlining (a problem that continues) and, 
more recently, too much credit, when predatory lenders targeted them for 
exploitative mortgages.
47
 In the Title IX version of discriminatory dualism, 
Swan argues that “many schools continue to participate in the historical 
tradition of mishandling campus sexual assault allegations and skewing 
Title IX procedures against complainants,” while “other schools have 
recently moved in the opposite direction.”
48
  
I admire Swan’s construct of discriminatory dualism, and commend her 
brilliant recent article that explains the phenomenon and backs it with 
stunning evidence.
49
 Her Title IX application of the construct is, to this 
reader, less well supported. In contrast to bias against victims of sexual 
assault (a group in which we can include persons who both do and do not 
report or complain), which scholars have described in well-documented 
research,
50
 bias that harms respondents is reported only in writings 
published outside of academic journals that lament what Swan calls 
“overcorrection.”
51
 Swan gives a respectful read to “Fairness for All 
Students Under Title IX,” an essay by Elizabeth Bartholet, Nancy Gertner, 
                                                                                                             
 45. Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism in Process: Title IX, Reverse Title IX, and 
Sexual Assault, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 69 (2020). 
 46. Id. at 74. 
 47. Id.; see also KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE 
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019) (positing, in a 
historical context, the wrong of “predatory inclusion”). 
 48. Swan, supra note 45, at 79. 
 49. Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54 GA. L. REV. 869 (2020). Swan’s readers 
also await “Marrying Discriminatory Dualism.” See Swan, supra note 45, at 75 n.29. 
 50. For a recent overview of the record, see Tara N. Richards, No Evidence of 
“Weaponized Title IX” Here: An Empirical Assessment of Sexual Misconduct Reporting, 
Case Processing, and Outcomes, 43 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 180, 181 (2019). 
 51. See Swan, supra note 45, at 73 n.19 (citing three popular articles found by 
symposium contributor Erin Buzuvis). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
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Janet Halley, and Jeannie Suk Gersen,
52
 that got dubbed The Revolt of the 
Feminist Law Profs in a Chronicle of Higher Education story.
53
 The claim 
in the Chronicle essay is that even feminists, not just rearguard defenders of 
male prerogative, now think Title IX resolution has gone too far in crediting 
accusations and punishing accused persons.
54
  
Maybe it has and maybe it hasn’t. I’d like to see the evidence. I do not 
doubt that Title IX enforcement has treated some number of accused 
individuals unfairly and reached some wrong results. The same could be 
said about every dispute resolution mechanism ever used anywhere. Both 
sexual predation and being accused of sexual predation are unpleasant 
experiences; adding institutional attention fuels this fire.
55
 After centuries of 
no remedy for sexual assault, the dawn of a new-ish era where respondents 
as well as victims are made to suffer is a setback for the respondent half of 
the binary. 
Enter lamentations over due process, covered separately by Swan and 
Kelly Behre. In their essay Bartholet, Gertner, Halley, and Gersen 
complained that Title IX procedures have denied accused persons powers 
and opportunities they want, including confrontation of their accusers, the 
assistance of counsel, appeals of adverse results, and a high hurdle of proof 
before penalties may ensue.
56
 Swan reviews two cases.
57
 “Contrary to 
popular rhetoric,” counters Professor Behre, “students responding to 
complaints of student code violations involving sexual misconduct (as well 
as dating violence, domestic violence, and stalking) do not have fewer due 
                                                                                                             
 52. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness%20for%20All%20Students.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 53. Wesley Yang, The Revolt of the Feminist Law Profs: Jeannie Suk Gersen and the 
Fight to Save Title IX from Itself, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www. 
chronicle.com/interactives/20190807-feminist-law-profs.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Adjudication will now and then lob a bit of good news to a plaintiff or defendant, I 
once wrote, but more often “it makes people feel like losers.” Bernstein, Communities, supra 
note 26, at 739. 
 56. See Yang, supra note 53. 
 57. Swan, supra note 45, at 79–80 (reviewing Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th 
Cir. 2019)); id. at 80 (reviewing the disciplinary proceedings of Francisco Sousa at San 
Diego State University). 
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process rights than students responding to other types of student code 
violations. They have more.”
58
  
Sexual misconduct occupies only a tiny percentage of behaviors 
proscribed in student codes.
59
 Students may not rape or stalk, but they also 
may not commit theft, (nonsexual) assault, vandalism, illicit drug use, 
underage drinking, academic cheating, on and on.
60
 For generations, those 
who broke these campus rules have been punished,
61
 and if any of them had 
the chance to question their accusers or hire a lawyer or gain timely process 
or attack anyone’s credibility, what they enjoyed was a grace or privilege 
rather than a right.
62
 But when the misbehavior is sexual, due process for 
the accused is apt to kick in. Behre gives a close read to Doe v. Allee, a 
recent decision holding that students accused of sexual misconduct within 
California colleges and universities have due process rights—rights that are 
not held by students accused of other code violations.
63
 
Toward More Accountability: Official Policy Liability  
Erin Buzuvis boldly suggests that universities might have “official 
policies of indifference to sexual misconduct.”
64
 Not deliberate 
indifference, a different standard on which claims tend to founder,
65
 but a 
policy of proceeding as if risks don’t exist and declining to learn about 
sources of danger.
66
 When institutions take a stance of disbelief in the 
reality of this danger at a point when reasonable people would guard against 
it, their posture can fairly be called their policy. 
Professor Buzuvis’s Article nicely illustrates the pattern I have found in 
the symposium: To understand the point of view held by a cohort is not 
                                                                                                             
 58. Kelly Alison Behre, Rape Exceptionalism Comes to California: Institutionalizing 
the Credibility Discount of College Students Reporting Sexual Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. 
REV. 101, 109 (2020) (footnote omitted). 
 59. Id. at 107.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 106 n.27.  
 63. Id. at 102–05 (discussing Doe v. Allee, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109 (Ct. App. 2019)). 
 64. Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Official Policy Liability: Maximizing the Law’s 
Potential to Hold Education Institutions Accountable for Their Responses to Sexual 
Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 36 (2020). 
 65. “Deliberate indifference” as a Title IX judicial standard comes from Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998), and Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). See also Buzuvis, supra note 64, at 40–41 
nn. 29–30, 36. 
 66. Buzuvis, supra note 64, at 42–43, 51–53. 
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necessarily to side with that cohort in litigation. More overtly than the other 
three writers who address the third cohort, Buzuvis wants to make 
universities more vulnerable to Title IX liability, not less. To Buzuvis, 
decisional law from 2016–2018 that accepted official policy liability points 
forward:
67
 “[O]fficial policy liability possesses untapped potential for 
leveraging Title IX to hold educational institutions accountable for 




“Untapped potential,” the phrase applied three lines ago to an emerging 
doctrinal development,
69
 also awaits in the works gathered in this 
Symposium. As contributors have shown, consent as an element of doctrine 
present in the resolution of sexual assault claims engages three cohorts. 
First, persons vulnerable to sexual predation might have consented to what 
they experienced. Second, persons accused of sexual predation might have 
engaged in what criminal law calls an actus reus without consent. Third, 
institutions tasked with adjudicating or otherwise processing accusations of 
sexual predation might have to determine the presence or absence of 
consent. 
Authors gathered in these pages have identified these three cohorts while 
not necessarily identifying with them. Persons vulnerable to sexual 
predation, persons vulnerable to accusations of sexual predation, and 
institutions obliged to comply with Title IX of the Civil Rights Act form a 
triangle of responsibility and redress.
70
 This Symposium gives us not only 




                                                                                                             
 67. See id. at 60 n.153 (citing Doe v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 654–56 (W.D. 
Tex. 2017); Doe v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 769–70 (W.D. Tex. 2018)); see also 
Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 807 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).  
 68. Buzuvis, supra note 64, at 67. 
 69. See id. 
 70. I borrow the phrase from a casebook title. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS (4th ed. 2016). 
 71. Elsewhere I have explored the accuser-accused-adjudicator/observer triad at greater 
length. See Bernstein, Aggression, supra note 26. 
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